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Abstract:	  This	  paper	  investigates	  some	  metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  assumptions	  behind	  Bogen	  
and	  Woodward’s	  data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	  inferences.	  	  I	  raise	  a	  series	  of	  points	  and	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  
possible	  Kantian	  stance	  about	  data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	   inferences.	   I	  clarify	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  suggested	  
Kantian	  stance	  by	  contrasting	  it	  with	  McAllister’s	  view	  about	  phenomena	  as	  patterns	  in	  data	  sets.	  
	  




Bogen	  and	  Woodward	  (1988)	  distinction	  between	  data	  and	  phenomena	  marks	  an	  important	  turning	  
point	  in	  recent	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  From	  a	  historical	  point	  of	  view,	  their	  notion	  of	  phenomena	  as	  
stable	  and	  repeatable	  features	  emerging	  out	  of	  different	  data	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  trend	  in	  
which	  phenomena	  are	  regarded	  as	  robust	  entities	  that	  scientiﬁc	  theories	  explain	  and	  predict,	  against	  
a	  ‘thinner’	  notion	  of	  phenomena	  typical	  of	  the	  empiricist	  tradition.	  As	  such,	  they	  have	  provided	  a	  foil	  
to	   re-­‐assess	   van	   Fraassen’s	   constructive	   empiricism.	   It	   is	   this	   particular	   aspect	   of	   Bogen	   and	  
Woodward’s	  position	  that	  originally	  hooked	  me	  and	  that	  I	  explored	  in	  connection	  with	  a	  criticism	  of	  
van	  Fraassen’s	  constructive	  empiricism	  in	  Massimi	  (2007).	  
In	   this	   paper,	   I	   do	  not	  want	   to	   discuss	   the	  merits	   of	   the	  data—phenomena	  distinction	  with	  
respect	  to	  van	  Fraassen’s	  	  view,	  nor	  do	  I	  want	  to	  present	  lengthy	  case	  studies	  taken	  from	  the	  history	  
of	   physics.	   My	   starting	   point	   is	   instead	   a	   puzzle:	   how	   should	   we	   intend	   the	   data—phenomena	  
distinction?	   Is	   it	   just	   descriptive	   of	   scientiﬁc	   practice?	   	   Or	   does	   it	   have	   a	   normative	   status?	   If	  
descriptive,	  we	  risk	  loosing	  ourselves	  into	  a	  plurality	  of	  case	  studies,	  each	  of	  which	  may	  be	  right	  in	  its	  
own	  terms,	  but	  it	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  clear	  what	  the	  exact	  role	  of	  the	  distinction	  is.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  we	  intend	  it	  as	  having	  a	  normative	  status,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  exactly	  data-­‐to-­‐
phenomena	  inferences	  ought	  to	  work.	  Although	  there	  may	  well	  not	  be	  a	  unique	  way	  in	  which	  data-­‐
to-­‐phenomena	   inferences	   ought	   to	   work,	   I	   think	   the	   distinction	  does	  have	   a	   normative	   status,	  
otherwise	  it	  could	  not	  bear	  on	  the	  epistemological	   implications	  against	  van	  Fraassen’s	  constructive	  
empiricism,	  for	  instance.	  
In	   this	   paper,	   I	   want	   to	   endorse	   an	   approach	   to	   the	   data—phenomena	   distinction	   which	  
is	  normative	   and	   naturalised	  at	   the	   same	   time,	   following	   the	   Kantian	   tradition	   of	   epistemological	  
naturalism.	  This	  is	  the	  tradition	  that	  claims	  that	  answers	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  knowledge	  (i.e.,	  of	  how	  
we	  know	  what	  we	  know)	  should	  be	  found	  by	  drawing	  on	  natural	  sciences.	  Or	  better,	  they	  should	  be	  
found	  by	  taking	  the	  natural	  sciences	  as	  paradigmatic	  of	  scientiﬁc	  knowledge	  and	  by	  investigating	  the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  we	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  nature.	  
My	  focus	  is	  on	  data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	  inference,	  as	  Woodward	  (1989,	  1998)	  has	  characterised	  it	  
in	   terms	   of	  statistical	   reliability	  and	  manipulationist	   causation.	   I	   introduce	   a	   Kantian	   stance	   on	  
phenomena	   and	   compare	   it	   with	   James	  McAllister’s	  (1997,	  2004,	   2007)	   alternative	   account	   of	  
phenomena	   as	   patterns	   in	   data	   sets.	   I	   agree	   with	   Bogen	   and	   Woodward’s	   bottom-­‐up	  
characterization	   of	   data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	   inference,	   but	   I	   draw	   a	   conclusion	   that	   Bogen	   and	  
Woodward	  would	  resist:	  namely,	  that	  phenomena	  are	  (partially)	  constituted	  by	  us,	  rather	  than	  being	  
ready-­‐made	   in	   nature.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   I	   grant	  with	  McAllister	   that	   phenomena	   have	   features	  
which	   are—in	   some	   relevant	   sense	   to	   be	   clariﬁed	   here	   below—mind-­‐dependent,	   but	   I	   resist	  
McAllister’s	  characterization	  of	  phenomena	  as	  patterns	  in	  data	  sets.	  Thus,	  a	  Kantian	  stance	  situates	  
itself	  in	  between	  the	  externalist	  account	  of	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward,	  and	  McAllister’s	  internal	  stone.	  
In	  Sect.	  2,	  I	  raise	  three	  points	  to	  show	  that	  statistical	  reliability	  and	  manipulationist	  causation	  
may	   not	   necessarily	   be	   sufﬁcient	   to	   individuate	   phenomena	   unequivocally.	   In	   Sect.	  3,	   I	   present	   a	  
Kantian	  stance	  on	  phenomena	   intended	  as	   ‘conceptualised	  appearances’,	  and	   I	  discuss	  some	  main	  
aspects	  of	   it	  by	  highlighting	   the	  points	  of	  convergence	  and	  divergence	  with	  respect	   to	  McAllister’s	  
view.	  
	  
2	  Metaphysics	  and	  epistemology	  in	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward’s	  notion	  of	  phenomena	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  want	  to	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  assumptions	  behind	  
the	  distinction	  between	  data	  and	  phenomena.	  
From	   a	   metaphysical	   point	   of	   view,	   Bogen	   and	   Woodward	   share	   realist	   intuitions	   about	  
phenomena:	   Phenomena	   exist	   ‘out	   there’	   in	   nature,	   as	   stable	   and	   repeatable	   features	   emerging	  
across	   a	   variety	   of	   experimental	   contexts	   and	   data.	   As	   Woodward	   nicely	   puts	   it:	   “Detecting	   a	  
phenomenon	  is	  like	  looking	  for	  a	  needle	  in	  a	  haystack	  or	  (…)	  like	  ﬁddling	  with	  a	  malfunctioning	  radio	  
until	  one’s	  favourite	  station	  ﬁnally	  comes	  through	  clearly”	  (Woodward	  1989,	  p.438).	  
Despite	  the	  variety	  and	  idiosyncratic	  nature	  of	  the	  causal	  factors	  involved	  in	  data	  production,	  
Woodward	   stresses	   the	   importance	  of	   controlling	   and	   screening	  off	   various	   causal	   inﬂuences	   that	  
may	  undermine	  the	  reliability	  of	  phenomena	  detection.	  The	  usual	  procedure	  consists	   in	  (1)	  control	  
of	   potential	   confounding	   factors;	   (2)	   elimination	  of	   background	  noise;	   (3)	   procedure	   for	   statistical	  
analysis	  and	  data	  reduction.	  Woodward’s	  analysis	  goes	  in	  a	  Cartwright–Hacking	  direction	  in	  claiming	  
that	  (1)–(3)	  are	  relatively	  theory-­‐free,	  and	  fall	  into	  the	  province	  of	  experimentalists’	  expertise,	  rather	  
than	   of	   theoreticians’.	   Not	   surprisingly,	   most	   of	   the	   examples	   from	   the	   history	   of	  
high-­‐energy	   physics	   draw	   on	   the	   works	   of	   historians	   and	   sociologists	   such	   as	  Galison	  
(1985);	  Franklin	  (1986);	  Collins	  (1981)	  and	  Pickering	  (1984).	  
Thus,	   the	   metaphysical	   framework	   is	   close	   to	   that	   of	   experimental	   realism,	   whereby	   (i)	  
phenomena	   such	   as	   weak	   neutral	   currents	  exist	  in	   the	   world	   ‘out	   there’;	   (ii)	   they	   manifest	  
themselves	   by	  causally	   producing	  data	   such	   as	   bubble	   chamber	   photographs,	   which	   we	   then	   (iii)	  
learn	   how	   to	   recognise	   from	   other	   data	   due	   to	   background	   noise	   via	  reliable	  procedures	   of	   data	  
analysis	  and	  data	  reduction.	  
Strictly	  coupled	  with	  this	  experimental	  realist	  metaphysics	   is	  the	  epistemology	  of	  reliabilism,	  
championed	   in	   recent	   times	   by	   Alvin	  Goldman	  (1986)	   among	   others.	   The	   key	   idea	   is	   that	   we	   are	  
justiﬁed	   to	   believe	   in	   a	   phenomenon	  p	  if	   the	   process	   that	   confers	   justiﬁcation	   is	   reliable,	   i.e.	  
generates	   true	   beliefs	   with	   high	   frequency.	   In	   other	   words,	   we	   are	   justiﬁed	   to	   believe	   in	   a	  
phenomenon	  p	  if	   the	   process	   of	   data	   production	   and	   data	   analysis	   is	  reliable,	   i.e.	   generates	   true	  
beliefs	   about	  p	  with	   high	   frequency.	  Woodward	  (1998)	   has	   addressed	   the	   issue	   of	   reliability	   by	  
explicitly	   drawing	   links	  with	   both	  Goldman’s	   epistemology	   and	  with	  Deborah	  Mayo’s	  (1996)	   error-­‐
statistical	  approach.	  The	  central	  idea	  is	  to	  identify	  patterns	  of	  counterfactual	  dependence	  between	  
data	  and	  phenomena	   that	   take	   the	   following	   form	  (Woodward	  1998,	  S166):	   “(1)	   if	  Dj	   is	  produced,	  
conclude	   that	   Pi	   is	   true.	   Then	   the	   ideal	   at	   which	   one	   aims	   is	   (2)	   the	   overall	   detection	   or	  
measurement	  procedure	  should	  be	  such	  that	  each	  of	  the	  conditionals	  of	  form	  (1)	  recommends	  that	  
one	   accept	   Pi	   when	   and	   only	   when	   Pi	   is	   correct.	   Somewhat	   more	   succinctly:	   the	   detection	   and	  
measurement	  procedure	  should	  be	  such	  that	  different	  sorts	  of	  data	  D1…Dm	  are	  produced	  in	  such	  a	  
way	   that	   investigators	   can	   use	   such	   data	   to	   reliably	   track	   exactly	   which	   of	   the	   competing	   claims	  
P1…Pn	  is	  true”.	  
A	   distinctive	   feature	   of	   reliabilism	   is	   that	   it	   licenses	   theory-­‐free	   data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	  
inferences:	  “in	  order	  for	  data	  to	  be	  reliable	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  some	  phenomenon(…),it	  is	  
neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufﬁcient	  that	  one	  possesses	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  the	  data	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
causal	  process	  leading	  to	  it	  from	  the	  phenomenon”	  Woodward	  (1989,pp.403–404):	  
	  
• It	   is	   not	   sufﬁcient	  because	  even	   if	   a	  phenomenon	  plays	   a	   causal	   role	   in	   the	  production	  of	  
data,	   it	   may	   well	   be	   impossible	   to	   extract	   reliable	   information	   from	   the	   data	   about	   the	  
phenomenon	   of	   interest.	   For	   example,	   although	  W	   and	   Z	   bosons	   are	   produced	   in	   bubble	  
chambers,	   in	   1960s	   and	   70s	   no	   one	   used	   bubble	   chambers	   to	   detect	  W	   and	   Z	   because	   it	  
meant	   to	   locate	   a	   very	   rare	  event	   among	  millions	  of	   pictures,	   “an	   impractical	   l	   task”	  until	  
Carlo	  Rubbia	  did	  it	  in	  the	  1980s.	  
• It	   is	  not	  necessary	  either	  because	  data	  can	  provide	  reliable	  evidence	  for	  some	  phenomena	  
even	   if	  one	   is	   ignorant	  of	  or	  mistaken	  about	   the	  character	  of	   the	  causal	  processes	   leading	  
from	   the	   phenomena	   to	   the	   data.	   For	   instance,	   Donald	   Glaser,	   who	   invented	   the	   bubble	  
chamber,	  was	  himself	  quite	  mistaken	  about	  the	  actual	  causal	  mechanism	  at	  work	  in	  bubble	  
chambers	  (which	  he	  misinterpreted	  as	  electrostatic	  repulsion).	  
	  
Thus,	   there	   are	   two	   main	   interrelated	   assumptions	   behind	   Bogen	   and	   Woodward’s	   notion	   of	  
phenomena:	  	  
	  
I.	  Metaphysics:	  Phenomena	  are	  ready-­‐made	  in	  nature	  and	  they	  manifest	  themselves	  by	  
causally	  producing	  data.	  
II.	  Epistemology:	  Reliability	  is	  the	  epistemic	  criterion	  for	  knowing	  phenomena	  from	  data.	  
	  
	  
2.1	  Three	  points	  about	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward’s	  notion	  of	  phenomena	  
	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	  want	   to	   raise	   three	  points	   concerning	  both	   the	  metaphysical	   and	  epistemological	  
assumptions	  above.	  
	  
2.1.1	  On	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  ready-­‐made	  phenomena:	  underdetermination	  of	  phenomena	  by	  data	  
	  
The	   problem	  with	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   ready-­‐made	   phenomena	   is	   that	   it	   is	   not	   always	   clear	  what	  
signal	  we	  should	  be	  looking	  for	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  noise:	  in	  fact,	  there	  could	  well	  be	  more	  than	  one	  relevant	  
signal	  compatible	  with	  the	  same	  data.	  To	  put	  it	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  the	  data	  from	  which	  we	  have	  to	  
infer	  the	  phenomena	  can	  be	  causally	  produced	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  phenomena	  under	  suitable	  
experimental	  conditions,	  so	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  which	  phenomena	  the	  data	  provide	  evidence	  for	  may	  
well	   be	   underdetermined	   by	   the	   data.	   I	   have	   explored	   this	  entity-­‐version	   of	   the	   classical	  
underdetermination	  problem	  in	  relation	  to	  Hacking’s	  experimental	  realism	  (1983)	  in	  Massimi	  (2004),	  
where	   I	   concluded	   that	   “whenever	   we	   have	   prima	   facie	   rival	   potential	   causes	   for	   the	   same	  
phenomena,	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  between	  them	  and	  to	  determine	  which	  entity-­‐with-­‐causal-­‐power	  
has	  actually	  produced	  the	  observed	  effect,	  we	  must	  in	  the	  end	  rely	  on	  a	  description	  of	  what	  causal	  
powers/	   capacities	   /dispositions	   an	   entity	  is	  to	   have	   so	   as	   to	   produce	   the	   observed	   effects.	   This	  
description	  is	  given	  by	  a	  scientiﬁc	  theory”	  (ibid.,	  pp.42–43).	  Let	  me	  clarify	  this	  point.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  re-­‐
statement	  of	  the	  theory-­‐ladeness	  of	  observation.	  I	  am	  making	  a	  more	  radical	  claim.	  I	  claim	  that	  there	  
can	  be	  more	  than	  one	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  carve	  data	  production,	  analysis,	  and	  reduction,	  given	  the	  
various	  contextual	  factors	  in	  the	  sea	  of	  noise.	  And	  what	  sort	  of	  phenomena	  we	  infer	  depends	  on	  the	  
way	  we	  have	  carved	  and	  ‘massaged’	  those	  data.	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  constraints,	  and	  in	  no	  way	  do	  I	  
want	  to	  suggest	  that	  anything	  goes,	  as	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  when	  I	  present	  my	  Kantian	  stance.	  
But	   to	   go	   back	   to	   this	   ﬁrst	   point,	   the	   same	   data	   may	   be	   compatible	   with	   more	   than	   one	  
phenomenon,	   and	   simply	   manipulating	   /	   controlling	   data	   at	   the	   experimental	   level	   may	   not	   be	  
sufﬁcient	   to	   discriminate	   what	   entity-­‐with-­‐causal-­‐powers	   has	   produced	   them.	   Woodward	  (1998,	  
S167)	  acknowledges	  the	  problem:	  	  
	  
Consider	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  presence	  of	  neutral	  currents	  is	  in	  fact	  sufﬁcient	  for	  (…)	  or	  has	  in	  
fact	  caused	  certain	  bubble	  chamber	  photographs	  D1.	  If	  some	  other	  competing	  phenomena	  
claim	   P2—e.g.	   that	   background	   neutrons	   are	   present—	   is	   also	   sufﬁcient	   for	   D1	   or	   if	  
background	  neutrons	  would	  also	  cause	  D1	  (…),	  then	  the	  overall	  detection	  procedure	  is	  very	  
likely	   such	   that	   one	   would	   conclude	   P1	   even	   if	   P2	   is	   correct.	   In	   this	   case	   the	   pattern	   of	  
counter	   factual	  dependence	  described	  above	  will	  not	  be	  satisﬁed	  and	  D1	  will	  not	  be	  good	  
evidence	  for	  P1.	  The	  pattern	  of	  counter	  factual	  dependence	  just	  described	  is	  an	  ideal,	  which	  
for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  is	  rarely	  fully	  satisﬁed	  in	  practice.	  
	  
The	  conclusion	  he	  draws	  is	  that	  data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	  inferences	  are	  probabilistic	  rather	  than	  
deterministic.	  Thus,	  one	  possible	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  underdetermination	  of	  phenomena	  by	  
data	  consists	  in	  offering	  a	  probabilistic	  version	  of	  reliability.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  burden	  of	  supporting	  the	  
metaphysics	  of	  ready-­‐made	  phenomena	  is	  shifted	  to	  the	  epistemology	  of	  reliabilism,	  to	  which	  I	  now	  
turn.	  
	  
2.1.2	  On	  reliability	  as	  an	  epistemic	  criterion	  independent	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  
leading	  from	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  the	  data	  
	  
The	  main	  novelty	  of	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward’s	  notion	  of	  phenomena	  is	  their	  use	  of	  reliabilism	  to	  back	  
up	   their	   experimental	   realist	   metaphysics.	   In	   epistemology,	   reliabilism	   has	   been	   championed	   in	  
recent	   times	   by	   Alvin	   Goldman	   and	   Fred	  Dretske	  (1981),	   among	   others.	   The	   distinctive	   feature	   of	  
reliabilism	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  justiﬁcation	  for	  beliefs	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  
the	  causal	  mechanism	  behind	  data	  production,	  as	  we	  saw	  above.	  So	  it	  is	  this	  claim	  that	  we	  have	  to	  
assess	  here.	  
Consider	   the	   following	   counterexample.	   An	   experimenter	   may	   come	   to	   believe	   in	   a	  
phenomenon	  p	  by	   a	   reliable	   process,	   i.e.	   a	   process	   that	   generates	   true	  beliefs	   about	  p	   from	  data	  
with	  high	  frequency,	  although	  the	  experimenter’s	  undergoing	  this	  process	  is	  caused	  in	  an	  unreliable	  
way	   (for	   instance,	   the	   experimenter	   may	   have	   learnt	   a	   reliable	   data	   reduction	   process	   from	   an	  
unreliable	  colleague),	  so	  that	  although	  the	  belief-­‐forming	  process	  is	  reliable	  we	  would	  not	  count	  it	  as	  
justified	  belief.	  
Goldman	   responds	   to	   this	   type	   of	   counterexample	   by	   introducing	   second-­‐order	   processes	  
(1986,	  p.	  115):	  “A	  second-­‐order	  process	  might	  be	  considered	  metareliable	  if,	  among	  the	  methods	  (or	  
first-­‐order	   processes)	   it	   outputs,	   the	   ratio	   of	   those	   that	   are	   reliablemeets	   some	   specified	   level,	  
presumably	  greater	  than	  .50”.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  over	  time	  the	  use	  of	  second-­‐order	  processes	  improves	  
calibration	  by	  managing	  to	  discard	  poorly	  calibrated	  processes.	  	  
However,	   there	   is	   a	   problem	  with	   this	   strategy	   of	   delegating	   the	   judgment	   of	   reliability	   for	  
first-­‐order	  processes	  to	  second-­‐order	  processes	  (which	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  experimentalist	  notion	  of	  
calibration—see	  Franklin	  1997).1	  And	   it	   is	   a	  problem	   that	  affects	  more	   in	  general	   reliabilism	  as	  an	  
externalist	  epistemology.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  engenders	  a	  bootstrapping	  mechanism,	  as	  Jonathan	  
Vogel	   (2000)	  has	  argued	  against	  Goldman;	  namely,	   the	  use	  of	   reliabilism	   itself	   to	   sanction	   its	  own	  
legitimacy.	   Suppose	   someone	   believes	   whatever	   a	   spectrometer	   says	   about	   the	   spectrum	   of	   a	  
certain	   chemical	   substance,	   without	   having	   justification	   for	   believing	   that	   the	   spectrometer	   is	  
reliable.2	  Suppose	  that	  the	  spectrometer	  happens	  to	  function	  very	  well.	  Then,	  an	  experimenter	  looks	  
at	  it	  and	  forms	  the	  belief	  “In	  this	  case,	  the	  spectrometer	  reads	  ‘X’	  for	  substance	  a,	  and	  X”,	  where	  X	  is	  
the	  proposition	  that	  substance	  a	  has	  infrared	  spectrum.	  Since	  the	  experimenter’s	  perceptual	  process	  
of	   reading	   the	   spectrometer	   is	   presumably	   reliable	   (she	  does	  not	   suffer	   from	  hallucinations,	   etc.),	  
given	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  spectrometer	  is	  functioning	  alright,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  experimenter	  
is	  justified	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  spectrum	  of	  substance	  a	  is	  infrared.	  Therefore,	  the	  experimenter	  can	  
deduce	   that	   “On	   this	   occasion,	   the	   spectrometer	   is	   reading	   accurately”.	   Suppose	   she	   iterates	   this	  
procedure	  many	   times,	   without	   ever	   checking	   whether	   the	   spectrometer	   is	   reliable	   because	   it	   is	  
properly	   wired,	   etc.	   By	   induction,	   the	   experimentalist	   infers	   that	   “The	   spectrometer	   is	   in	   general	  
reliable”,	   and	   hence	   goes	   on	   to	   use	   it	   in	   other	   cases	   to	   measure	   the	   spectrum	   of	   unknown	  
substances.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  experimentalist	  would	  fall	  prey	  of	  bootstrapping	  circularity.	  
Goldman	  (2008,	  p.	  17)	  replies	  to	  Vogel’s	  bootstrapping	  objection	  by	  saying	  that	  “the	  problem	  
is	   not	   unique	   to	   reliabilism,	   but	   it	   is	   shared	   by	   many	   epistemologies.	   (…)	   Thus,	   if	   a	   theory	   like	  
reliabilism—or	  any	  form	  of	  externalism—makes	  easy	  knowledge	  possible,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  terrible	  thing.	  
Skepticism	  is	  a	  very	  unwelcome	  alternative”.	  
If	   scepticism	   is	   certainly	   an	   unwelcome	   alternative,	   it	   is	   not	   however	   the	   only	   one.	   The	  
counterexample	   shows,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   how	   despite	   the	   attractiveness,	   reliabilism	   is	   not	   itself	  
exempt	   from	   difficulties.	   One	   of	   these	   difficulties	   resides	   in	   the	   attempt	   to	   secure	   knowledge	   by	  
detaching	  reliability	  from	  the	  causal	  knowledge	  of	  the	  mechanism	  that	  generates	  true	  beliefs	  from	  
data	  with	  high	  frequency.	  Woodward	  (1998,	  S176)	  stresses	  again	  this	  point:	  “The	  idea	  that	  one	  can	  
often	  empirically	  establish	   that	   (4)	  a	  detection	  process	   is	   reliable	  without	   (5)	  deriving	   its	   reliability	  
from	   some	   general	   theory	   of	   how	   that	   process	  works	   and/or	  why	   it	   is	   reliable	   is	   supported	   by	   a	  
number	  of	  episodes	  in	  the	  history	  of	  science.	  (…)	  Galileo	  advanced	  a	  number	  of	  empirical	  arguments	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Woodward	  (1998,	  p.	  S171)	  refers	  to	  Franklin’s	  analysis	  of	  calibration	  within	  the	  context	  of	  empirical	  
assessment	  of	  reliability:	  “One	  important	  example	  (…)	  is	  the	  strategy	  that	  Allan	  Franklin	  (1997)	  calls	  
calibration.	  Here	  one	  assesses	  the	  error	  characteristics	  of	  a	  method	  by	  investigating	  its	  ability	  to	  detect	  or	  
measure	  known	  phenomena	  and	  then	  assumes	  that	  the	  method	  will	  have	  similar	  error	  characteristics	  when	  
used	  to	  investigate	  some	  novel	  phenomenon”.	  
2	  The	  following	  example	  is	  patterned	  upon	  Vogel’s	  (2000,	  pp.	  612–615)	  reformulation	  of	  Michael	  Williams’	  
“gas-­‐gauge	  case”.	  
showing	   that	   his	   telescope	   was	   a	   reliable	   instrument	   in	   various	   astronomical	   applications	   even	  
though	  he	  lacked	  a	  correct	  optical	  theory	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  how	  that	  instrument	  worked	  
or	  why	  it	  was	  reliable”.	  
I	   am	   not	   entirely	   convinced	   by	   this	   argument.	   I	   think	   that	   reliability	   cannot	   be	   entirely	  
detached	   from	   the	   causal	   knowledge	   of	   the	   mechanism	   that	   generates	   true	   beliefs	   with	   high	  
frequency.	   Take	   Galileo’s	   telescope	   and	   the	   controversy	   it	   sparked	   about	   the	   actual	   size	   of	   fixed	  
stars.	   True,	   Galileo	  may	   not	   have	   had	   a	   full-­‐blown	   or	   the	   right	   optical	   theory	   to	   explain	   how	   the	  
telescope	  worked	  or	  why	  it	  was	  reliable,	  but	  he	  did	  have	  a	  causal	  explanation	  connecting	  the	  size	  of	  
the	  stars	  (based	  on	  his	  Copernican	  belief),	  to	  the	  function	  of	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  telescope	  in	  making	  the	  
objects	   appear	  more	   similar	   to	   the	  way	   they	   are	   in	   nature.	  His	   opponents	   endorsed	   the	  opposite	  
causal	   explanation	   about	   the	   actual	   size	   of	   the	   stars	   (which	   they	   believed	  were	   bright	   spots	   on	   a	  
celestial	  sphere)	  and	  the	  function	  of	  the	  lens,	  which—they	  thought—distorted	  the	  actual	  size	  of	  the	  
stars.	   Galileo	   famously	   resorted	   to	   some	   non-­‐telescopic	   observations	   to	   avoid	   possible	   objections	  
against	   the	   reliability	   of	   his	   telescope	   (see	   Frankel	   1978).	   Nonetheless,	   several	   people	   from	  
Christopher	   Clavius	   to	   Lodovico	   delle	   Colombe	   and	   Cesare	   Cremonini	   objected	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	  
telescope	   and	   its	   reliability.	   One	   of	   the	   main	   objections	   was	   that	   the	   telescope	   was	   unreliable	  
because	   it	  did	  not	   seem	  to	  magnify	   the	   stars,	  by	   contrast	  with	  other	  objects:	   the	   size	  of	   the	   stars	  
observed	  with	  naked	  eye	  at	  night	  and	  with	  the	  telescope	  was	  approximately	  the	  same.	  At	  stake	   in	  
this	  debate	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  halos	  of	  the	  stars	  visible	  with	  naked	  eye	  should	  be	  
taken	  or	  not	  into	  account	  in	  the	  estimate	  of	  the	  actual	  size	  of	  the	  stars:	  Aristotelians	  such	  as	  Horatio	  
Grassi	   thought	   that	   it	   should,	  while	  Galileo	   thought	   that	   it	   should	  not	  because	   it	  was	   illusory.	  The	  
debate	  sparked	  when	  Grassi	  published	  (under	  the	  pseudonym	  of	  Lothario	  Sarsi)	  this	  objection	  to	  the	  
reliability	  of	  the	  telescope	  in	  his	  1619	  Libra	  astronomica,	  which	  Galileo	  rejected	  in	  Il	  Saggiatore.	  
The	  controversy	  that	  raged	  during	  Galileo’s	  time	  around	  the	  use	  of	  the	  telescope	  and	  how	  to	  
interpret	   the	  data,	   testifies	   in	  my	   view	   to	   the	   central	   importance	   that	   causal	   explanation	  plays	   in	  
assessing	   reliability	   claims.	   The	   final	   verdict	   went	   to	   Galileo	   because	   the	   scientific	   community	  
eventually	   embraced	   Galileo’s	   causal	   explanation	   of	   how	   the	   telescope	   worked	   and	   why	   it	   was	  
reliable.	  
Another	  example	  could	  be	  cathode	  rays.	  Originally	  discovered	  by	  Julius	  Plücker	  in	  1859,	  they	  
became	  a	   standard	   tool	   for	  different	   generations	  of	   scientists	   that	  used	   them	   in	   conjunction	  with	  
different	   causal	   explanations	   of	   the	   fluorescence	   observed.	   The	   current	   causal	   explanation	   is	   that	  
cathode	   rays	  are	   streams	  of	  electrons	  projected	   from	   the	  cathode	  by	  electrical	   repulsion.	  But	   this	  
was	   not	   the	   causal	   explanation	   endorsed	   by	   nineteenth	   century	   physicists.	   Indeed,	   their	   different	  
causal	   explanations	   of	   the	   mechanism	   led	   to	   very	   different	   data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	   inferences:	   from	  
Arthur	   Crookes’s	   ‘particles’	   (ranging	   from	   molecules	   to	   an	   unknown	   state	   of	   matter);	   to	   J.J.	  
Thomson’s	  ‘corpuscles’	  carriers	  of	  electricity;	  to	  Joseph	  Larmor’s	  ‘electrons’	  as	  permanent	  structural	  
features	   of	   the	   ether.	   No	   wonder	   this	   historical	   episode	   has	   attracted	   much	   attention	   among	  
historians	   and	   philosophers	   of	   science	   that	   are	   still	   trying	   to	   resolve	   the	   historiographic	   dispute	  
about	  who	   really	   discovered	   the	   electron	   (see	   Achinstein	   2001,	   and	   Arabatzis	   2006).We	   see	   here	  
another	  example	  of	  how	  reliability	  claims	  cannot	  be	  completely	  disentangled	  from	  discussions	  about	  




2.1.3	   On	   whether	   the	   epistemology	   of	   reliabilism	   can	   support	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   ready-­‐made	  
phenomena	  
	  
There	   is	   a	   third	   point	   I	   want	   to	   make.	   One	  may	   wonder	   to	   what	   extent	   reliabilism	   supports	   the	  
metaphysics	  of	  ready-­‐made	  phenomenena.	  Or	  better,	  whether	  that	  metaphysics	  finds	  back-­‐up	  in	  the	  
epistemology	  of	   reliabilism.	  For	   instance,	  how	  do	  we	  know	  that	  neutral	  currents	  are	   ‘out	   there’	   in	  
nature?	   In	  Sect.	  2.1.1	  we	  discussed	  the	  problem	  of	  underdetermination	  of	  phenomena	  by	  data.	   In	  
Gargamelle	  bubble-­‐chamber,	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  was	  to	  identify	  whether	  the	  observed	  data	  were	  
the	  result	  of	  weak	  neutral	  currents	  (which	  scientists	  were	  looking	  for)	  or	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  neutron	  
background	   which	   can	   produce	   exactly	   the	   same	   data.	   We	   concluded	   Sect.	   2.1.1	   by	   mentioning	  
Woodward’s	   probabilistic	   version	   of	   reliabilism	   to	   support	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   ready-­‐made	  
phenomena.	   Can	   the	   probabilistic	   version	   of	   reliabilism	   support	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   ready-­‐made	  
phenomena?	  
I	  suspect	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  negative	  for	  the	  following	  reason.	  Until	  we	  have	  
specified	  the	  class	  of	  contexts	  within	  which	  processes	  of	  data	  production,	  analysis	  and	  reduction	  are	  
to	  operate,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  these	  processes	  can	  generate	  true	  beliefs	  about	  phenomena	  with	  
high	  frequency.	  The	  problem	  with	  reliabilism—even	  in	  the	  probabilistic	  version—is	  that	  we	  need	  to	  
specify	   in	  advance	  what	  our	  epistemic	  goals	  are	  and	  need	   to	  give	  an	  exact	  account	   for	  appraising	  
reliability	  (‘reliable	  with	  respect	  to	  what?’).	  Unless	  we	  somehow	  know	  already	  how	  the	  phenomena	  
that	  we	  are	  searching	  for	  should	  look	  like,	  how	  can	  we	  appraise	  whether	  data	  production	  and	  data	  
reduction	   provide	   reliable	   evidence	   for	   them?	   In	   a	  way,	   this	   problem	   is	   a	   re-­‐elaboration	   of	   what	  
Harry	   Collins	   (1985/1992)	   has	   described	   as	   the	   experimenter’s	   regress:	   in	   order	   to	   prove	   that	   an	  
experimental	  process	  is	  reliable,	  we	  have	  to	  show	  that	  it	  identifies	  the	  phenomenon	  correctly.	  But	  in	  
order	   to	   identify	   the	   phenomenon	   correctly,	   one	   has	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   experimental	   process	   whose	  
reliability	  is	  precisely	  at	  stake.	  So	  reliability	  seems	  to	  fall	  back	  into	  a	  justificatory	  circle.	  
My	  claim	  is	  that	  unless	  we	  have	  a	  causal	  story,	  which	  normally	  comes	  from	  a	  scientific	  theory	  
that	   helps	   us	   discriminate	   genuine	   phenomena	   from	   confounding	   factors,	   and	   enter	   in	   the	   way	  
experiments	   are	   conceived,	   designed,	   and	   thought	   out,	   it	   may	   be	   very	   hard	   (and	   sometimes	  
practically	  impossible)	  to	  discern	  phenomena	  on	  purely	  experimental	  grounds.	  To	  paraphrase	  an	  old	  
slogan	  about	   causes,	   ‘No	  phenomena	   in,	   no	  phenomena	  out’.	   In	   sum,	   reliabilism	  presupposes	   the	  
same	  metaphysics	  of	  readymade	  phenomena	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  back	  up.	  
One	  may	  respond	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  ready-­‐made	  phenomena	  is	  ultimately	  
supported	   by	   some	   sort	   of	   Kripkean	   essentialism,	   according	   to	  which	   there	   are	   natural	   kinds	   and	  
they	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  a	  reliable	  way	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  data	  and	  experimental	  procedures,	  
even	  if	  we	  either	  do	  not	  know	  or	  simply	  cannot	  practically	  identify	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  that	  goes	  
from	  natural	   kinds	   to	  data	  production.	   This	   is	   not	   an	  option	   that	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward	  expressly	  
discuss,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware	  of,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  fairly	  standard	  move	  for	  realists	  to	  make	  when	  pressed	  on	  
metaphysical	  issues.	  
But	  not	  even	  this	  move	  would	  solve	   the	  circularity	  between	  the	  metaphysics	  of	   ready-­‐made	  
phenomena	   and	   reliabilism.	   Indeed	   the	   circularity	   problem	   would	   crop	   up	   again	   this	   time	   in	   the	  
bottom-­‐up	   inductive	   nature	   of	   the	   data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	   inference.	  We	  may	   indeed	   ask	   how	  many	  
‘positive	   instances’	   provide	   increasing	   evidential	   support	   for	   data-­‐claims	   which	   would	   qualify	   as	  
reliable	  evidence	  for	  a	  certain	  phenomenon.	  How	  can	  we	  guarantee	  that	  the	  next	  few	  instances	  are	  
not	  going	  to	  be	  negative	  and	  hence	  are	  not	  going	  to	  have	  a	  knock-­‐down	  effect	  on	  the	  data-­‐claim	  we	  
are	   trying	   to	   build	   for	   reliably	   inferring	   a	   certain	   phenomenon?	   Of	   course,	   this	   old	   problem	   of	  
induction—applied	   to	   bottom-­‐up	   data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	   inferences—has	   direct	   implications	   for	   how	  
we	  look	  at	  the	  history	  of	  science	  and	  scientific	  revolutions.	  When	  did	  (inductively	  supported)	  data-­‐
claims	  about	  combustion	  stop	  being	  considered	  as	  reliable	  evidence	  for	  phlogiston,	  and	  begun	  to	  be	  
regarded	   as	   reliable	   evidence	   for	   oxygen?	   As	   my	   colleague	   Hasok	   Chang	   (2008)	   is	   currently	  
reconstructing	   in	   his	  work	   on	   the	   Chemical	   Revolution,	   answering	   this	   question	   (and	   similar	   ones	  
about	  caloric	  and	  ether)	  is	  far	  from	  trivial.	  And	  it	  seems	  that	  unless	  we	  know	  already	  that	  phlogiston	  
is	   not	   a	   natural	   kind,	   while	   oxygen	   is,	   reliability	   per	   se	   does	   not	   cut	   any	   ice	   in	   answering	   those	  
questions. Thus,	  natural	  kinds	  can	  certainly	  back	  up	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  ready-­‐made	  phenomena,	  but	  
not	  the	  epistemology	  of	  reliabilism:	  unless	  one	  knows	  already	  that	  something	  is	  a	  natural	  kind	  (e.g.	  
that	  oxygen	  is,	  but	  phlogiston	  is	  not),	  one	  cannot	  legitimately	  claim	  to	  infer	  it	  from	  data	  in	  a	  reliable	  
way,	  i.e.	  in	  a	  way	  that	  generates	  true	  beliefs	  with	  high	  frequency.	  
	  
3	  A	  Kantian	  stance	  on	  phenomena	  
	  
I	  turn	  now	  to	  a	  Kantian	  stance	  on	  phenomena	  and	  hence	  on	  data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	  inferences,	  building	  
up	   on	   some	   intuitions	   originally	   presented	   in	   Massimi	   (2007),	   and	   highlight	   some	   of	   the	  
metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  features	  that	  make	  it	  worth	  pursuing	  it,	  to	  my	  eyes.	  
I	   said	   a	   “Kantian	   stance”.	   It	   is	   a	   ‘stance’,	   because	   echoing	   van	   Fraassen	   (2002)	   there	   is	   an	  
element	  of	  voluntarism	   in	  endorsing	  a	  Kantian	  perspective	  on	  phenomena.	   I	  do	  not	  aim	  to	  offer	  a	  
scientific,	  quasi-­‐scientific	  or	  metaphysical	  theory	  of	  phenomena	  cognition,	  but	  only	  to	  describe	  the	  
human	  epistemic	   conditions	  under	  which	  we	   gain	   knowledge	  of	   phenomena.	   In	   this	   sense,	  what	   I	  
present	  here	  below	  is	  only	  a	  ‘stance’	  that	  is	  non-­‐committal	  about	  any	  specific	  matters	  of	  fact	  about	  
human	  cognition.	  So	  much	  for	  clarifying	  why	  I	  call	  it	  a	  ‘stance’.	  
It	   is	   ‘Kantian’	   because	   it	   goes	   back	   to	   Immanuel	   Kant’s	   insight	   about	   phenomena	   as	  
“conceptualised	   appearances”.	   Kant	   drew	   an	   important	   distinction	   between	   what	   he	   called	  
‘appearances’	   and	   ‘phenomena’.	   An	   appearance,	   for	   Kant,	   is	   “the	   undetermined	   object	   of	   an	  
empirical	  intuition”	  Kant	  (1781/1787,	  A20/B34).	  Appearance	  refers	  then	  to	  an	  object	  as	  merely	  given	  
in	   sensibility	   and	   conceptually	   still	   ‘undetermined’,	   not	   brought	   yet	   under	   the	   categories	   of	   the	  
faculty	   of	   understanding.	   A	   phenomenon,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   a	   conceptually	   determined	  
appearance,	   namely	   an	   appearance	   that	   has	   been	   brought	   under	   the	   categories	   of	   the	  
understanding:	  “appearances,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  as	  objects	  they	  are	  thought	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
unity	  of	  the	  categories,	  are	  called	  phenomena”	  (ibid.,	  A249).	  We	  gain	  scientific	  knowledge	  of	  nature	  
by	  subsuming	  appearances	   (i.e.	  spatiotemporal	  objects	  as	  given	  to	  our	  mind	   in	  empirical	   intuition)	  
under	  a	  priori	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding	  (via	  schemata).	  
In	  Massimi	  (2008,	  and	  forthcoming)	  I	  claimed	  that	  the	  special	  role	  Kant	  assigned	  to	  Galilean–
Newtonian	  physics	  should	  be	  understood	  precisely	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  new	  conception	  of	  phenomena	  
Kant	  was	  putting	  forward.	  Phenomena	  are	  not	  ready-­‐made	  in	  nature,	  instead	  we	  have	  somehow	  to	  
make	  them.	  And	  we	  make	  them	  by	  first	  ascribing	  certain	  spatiotemporal	  properties	  to	  appearances	  
(for	  instance,	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  free-­‐fall	  investigated	  by	  Galileo,	  the	  property	  of	  acquiring	  the	  
same	   speed	   over	   different	   inclined	   planes	   with	   the	   same	   height),	   and	   then	   by	   subsuming	   them	  
under	  a	  causal	  concept,	  such	  as	  Newton’s	  gravitational	  attraction.	  But	  to	  what	  extent	  can	  we	  extract	  
Kant’s	  conception	  of	  phenomena	  from	  its	  philosophical	  and	  historical	  context,	  and	  make	  it	  valuable	  
for	   current	   discussions	   about	   data	   and	   phenomena?	  How	  would	   a	   Kantian	   stance	   on	   phenomena	  
look	  like?	  And	  what	  good	  would	  it	  be?	  
Here	   is	  my	   suggestion,	  which	   is	   only	   tentative	  and	  does	  not	   claim	   to	  be	  exhaustive	  or	   all-­‐
encompassing:	  
	  
(A)	   The	   inference	   from	   data	   to	   phenomena	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   relation	   Kant	   envisaged	  
between	  appearances	  and	  phenomena	  as	  follows:	  
	  
i.	  Scientific	  investigation	  starts	  with	  data,	  observable	  records	  of	  occurrences	  which	  can	  take	  
the	   form	   of	   conditional	   relative	   frequencies	   (e.g.	   how	  many	   times	   the	   ‘green’	   light	   of	   a	  
particle	  detector	  goes	  off,	  given	  a	  chosen	  experimental	  setting;	  how	  many	  times	  the	  same	  
degree	  of	  speed	  is	  recorded,	  given	  a	  plane	  with	  a	  certain	  inclination	  and	  height).	  
ii.	  Data	  are	  then	  plugged	  into	  salient	  experimental	  parameters	  (e.g.	  scattering	  cross-­‐section	  
in	  particle	  collisions;	  acceleration	  for	  free-­‐falling	  objects).	  	  
iii.	  The	  salient	  experimental	  parameters	  are	  then	  organised	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  possible	  
the	  production	  of	  graphs	  (which	  can	  or	  cannot	  be	  computer	  aided)	  showing	  how	  variation	  
in	  one	  experimental	  parameter	  affects	   variation	   in	  another	  experimental	  parameter	   (e.g.	  
how	   the	   scattering	   cross-­‐section	   varies	   by	   varying	   the	   energy	   of	   collision;3	   or	   how	   the	  
space-­‐to-­‐time	  relationship	  varies	  given	  a	  certain	  acceleration).	  It	  is	  at	  this	  level	  that	  a	  new	  
phenomenon	   can	  make	   its	   debut	   in	   the	   form	   of	   an	   unexpected	   graph	   solicited	   by	   data	  
plugged	  into	  the	  experimental	  parameters.	  
iv.	  We	   then	   have	   to	   find	   a	  model	  with	   new	   (unobservable	   and	  more	   removed	   from	  data)	  
parameters	   (e.g.	   the	   parameter	   R	   of	   hadron-­‐to-­‐muon	   production	   in	   scattering	   cross-­‐
sections	  of	  particles;	  or	  Newton’s	  gravitational	  constant	  g)	  that	  maximise	  the	  probability	  of	  
the	  graph	  found.	   It	   is	  at	  this	   level	  that	  a	  causal	  concept	   is	   introduced	  to	  back	  up	  the	  new	  
parameter	   in	   its	   job	  of	  maximising	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  found	  graph.	  So	  we	  say	  that	  the	  
parameter	  R	   shows	   an	  unexpected	   value	  of	   10/3	   (matching	   the	  unexpected	  peak	   at	   3.1.	  
GeV	  in	  the	  graph),	  because	  of	  some	  anomalous	  hadron	  production	  caused	  by	  the	  presence	  
of	   a	   fourth	   quark	   c	   with	   fractional	   charge	   2/3.	   Or	   we	   say	   that	   free-­‐falling	   objects	   obey	  
Galileo’s	   times-­‐squared	   law	   because	   the	   gravitational	   acceleration	  g	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	  
approximately	  constant	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  Earth.	  
	  
The	   phenomena	   scientists	   investigate	   are	   often	   the	   end	   product	   of	   these	   series	   of	  
intermediate	   steps,	   at	   quite	   a	   distance	   from	   the	   original	   data.	   Not	   only	   then	   can	   they	   be	  
unobservable,	  as	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward	  have	  rightly	  pointed	  out;	  they	  may	  also	  require	  a	  significant	  
amount	   of	   conceptual	   construction.	  By	  making	   phenomena	   the	   serendipitous	   result	   of	  what	   Kant	  
called	   the	   faculty	   of	   sensibility	   and	   the	   faculty	   of	   understanding,	   or—as	   we	   may	   prefer	   to	   say	  
today—the	   result	  of	  both	   input	   from	  nature	   (in	   the	   form	  of	  data)	  and	  human	  contribution	   (in	   the	  
form	  of	  causal	  concepts),	  a	  Kantian	  stance	  can	  capture	  the	  data-­‐to-­‐phenomena	  inference	  in	  a	  novel	  
way.	  
Indeed,	   I	   think	   that	   a	   Kantian	   stance	   on	   phenomena	   can	   satisfy	   Patrick	   Suppes	   (1962)	  
hierarchy	  of	  models	   and	   go	   in	   the	  direction	  of	   clarifying	   an	   important	  point	   about	   that	   hierarchy.	  
Suppes	   (1962,	   p.	   259)	   famously	   laid	   out	   an	   hierarchy	   of	   models,	   whereby	   the	   lowest	   layer	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  I	  am	  referring	  here	  to	  Burton	  Richter’s	  1974	  data	  model	  that	  led	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  an	  unexpected	  peak	  at	  
3.1	  GeV	  in	  the	  computer-­‐aided	  graph	  about	  the	  scattering	  cross-­‐section	  of	  electron–positron	  collisions	  
obtained	  by	  varying	  the	  energy	  of	  the	  collisions	  (for	  details	  of	  this	  case	  study	  in	  relation	  to	  my	  analysis	  of	  data	  
models,	  see	  Massimi	  2007).	  
occupied	  by	  “ceteris	  paribus	  conditions”,	  whose	   typical	  problems	  are	  noise	  control	  with	  no	   formal	  
statistics;	  the	  next	  layer	  up	  is	  “experimental	  design”,	  dealing	  with	  problems	  such	  as	  randomization,	  
assignment	  of	  subjects	  and	  any	  relevant	  info	  about	  the	  design	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Then,	  we	  have	  the	  
layer	  of	  “models	  of	  data”	  properly	  speaking,	  dealing	  with	  three	  main	  problems:	  (1)	  homogeneity,	  (2)	  
stationarity,	  (3)	  fit	  of	  experimental	  parameters,	  followed	  up	  by	  “models	  of	  experiment”	  dealing	  with	  
problems	   such	  as	  number	  of	   trials	   and	   choice	  of	   experimental	  parameters	   “far	   removed	   from	   the	  
actual	  data”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  255).	  Finally,	  on	  top	  of	  the	  hierarchy,	  we	  find	  “linear	  response	  models”	  dealing	  
with	  problems	  such	  as	  goodness	  of	  fit	  to	  models	  of	  data	  and	  estimation	  of	  parameters	  that	  may	  well	  
be	  unobservable	  (e.g.	  in	  Suppes’	  example	  from	  learning	  theory,	  the	  unobservable	  parameter	  which	  
“is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  recorded	  data”	  is	  the	  learning	  parameter	  θ	  taking	  as	  values	  real	  numbers).	  
First	   thing	   to	   note	   about	   this	   hierarchy	   is	   that	   noise	   control,	   data	  models	   and	   phenomena	  
constitute	  distinct	   layers.	   In	  particular,	  noise	  control	  belongs	   to	   the	   lowest	   layer	  of	  ceteris	  paribus	  
conditions,	  not	  even	  to	  the	  data	  models	   layer,	  even	   less	  so	  to	  the	   level	  of	   linear	  response	  models,	  
which	   I	   take	   to	   be	   identifiable	   with	   Bogen	   	   and	  Woodward’s	   ‘phenomena’,	   since	   it	   involves	   the	  
estimation	  of	  parameters	  not	  observable	  and	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  recorded	  data.	  
The	  crucial	  point	  about	  ‘data	  models’,	  ‘models	  of	  experiment’	  and	  ‘linear	  response	  models’—
to	  use	  Suppes’	  terminology—is	  to	  spell	  out	  the	  link	  between	  the	  experimental	  parameters,	  as	  given	  
by	   relative	   frequencies	   of	   occurrences	   (raw	  data)	  and	   the	   estimation	  of	   unobservable	   parameters	  
(like	  θ	   in	  Suppes’	  example	  from	  learning	  theory,	  or	  R	   in	  my	  (Massimi	  2007)	  Richter’s	  example	  from	  
high-­‐energy	  physics),	  which	  act	  at	  the	  interface	  between	  experiment	  and	  theory.	  This	  link	  is	  what	  a	  
Kantian	  stance	  can	  take	  care	  of,	  in	  my	  view.	  
The	   advantage	   of	   a	   Kantian	   stance	   is	   that	   it	   gives	   the	   bottom-­‐up,	   empiricist	   approach	  
championed	  by	  Suppes,	  Bogen	  	  and	  Woodward	  its	  due,	  while	  also	  acknowledging	  that	  phenomena	  
are	   in	  part	   the	  product	  of	   the	  way	  scientists	  carve	  nature	  at	   its	   joints.	   In	  the	  next	  section,	   I	   take	  a	  
closer	   look	   at	   a	   Kantian	   stance	   on	   phenomena	   by	   highlighting	   two	   main	   metaphysical	   and	  
epistemological	  aspects	  and	  by	  comparing	  and	  contrasting	  it	  with	  McAllister’s	  similar	  view.	  
	  
3.1	  Metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  aspects	  of	  a	  Kantian	  stance	  on	  phenomena	  
	  
3.1.1	  No	  ready-­‐made	  phenomena	  
	  
A	  Kantian	  stance	  does	  not	  commit	  to	  any	  metaphysics	  of	  ready-­‐made	  phenomena.	  From	  a	  Kantian	  
point	   of	   view,	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   scientific	   instruments	   and	   the	   ensuing	   production	   of	   data	  
together	   with	   what	   Kant	   called	   “principles	   of	   reason”	   play	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	   the	   constitution	   of	  
phenomena.	  
In	  Massimi	   (2008,	   and	   forthcoming)	   I	   have	   investigated	   this	   distinctive	   aspect	   of	   a	   Kantian	  
conception	   of	   phenomena	   in	   relation	   to	   Galileo’s	   mathematization	   of	   nature.	   From	   a	   Kantian	  
perspective,	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  inclined	  plane	  experiment	  was	  to	  extract	  from	  the	  appearance	  (motion	  
of	   a	   bronze	   ball	   along	   an	   inclined	   plane)	   the	   property	   of	   uniform	   acceleration	   that	   Galileo	   had	  
himself	  a	  priori	  inserted	  in	  the	  appearance	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  possible	  experience.	  Namely,	  for	  the	  sake	  
of	   experiencing	   uniformly	   accelerated	   motion,	   we	   must	   constitute	   the	   properties	   of	   free-­‐falling	  
bodies	  according	   to	  Galileo’s	  kinematical	   reasoning.	  Galileo	  did	  not	  arrive	  at	  his	   law	  of	   free	   fall	  by	  
simple	  curve-­‐fitting	  data	  about	  balls	  rolling	  down	  inclined	  planes.	  There	  was	  instead	  an	  element	  of	  
construction,	  a	  “principle	  of	  reason”	  that	  guided	  Galileo	  in	  his	  experiments	  with	  inclined	  planes	  and	  
led	  him	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  uniformly	  accelerated	  free-­‐falling	  bodies.	  
Similar	  analyses	  could	  of	  course	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  reference	  to	  many	  other	  examples	  and	  case	  
studies.	   The	   reason	   why	   I	   am	   concentrating	   on	   Galileo	   is	   because	   of	   its	   direct	   link	   with	   Kant,	   of	  
course,	   and	   also	   because	   it	   provides	   a	   springboard	   to	   contrast	   a	   Kantian	   stance	   with	   James	  
McAllister’s	  alternative	  analysis	  of	  Galileo	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  his	  account	  of	  phenomena	  as	  patterns	  in	  
data	   sets.	  Galileo	  provides	   indeed	  a	  nice	   foil	   to	   compare	   the	  mind-­‐dependence	   inherent	  a	  Kantian	  
account	  with	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  mind-­‐dependence	  implicit	  in	  McAllister’s	  account,	  to	  which	  I	  now	  
turn.4	  
McAllister	   (1997)	   locates	  mind-­‐dependence	   in	   the	   contingent,	   investigator-­‐dependent	   noise	  
control	  settings,	  which	  as	  a	  result	  engender	  different	  phenomena	  out	  of	  the	  same	  data	  set:	  	  
	  
any	   given	   data	   set	   can	   be	   described	   as	   the	   sum	   of	   any	   one	   of	   infinitely	   many	   distinct	  
patterns	   and	   a	   corresponding	   incidence	   of	   noise.	   (…)	   ‘Pattern	   A	   +	   noise	   at	   m	   percent’,	  
‘Pattern	  B	  +	  noise	  at	  n	  percent’	  and	  so	  on.	   (…)	  As	  a	  data	   set	   lends	   itself	  equally	   readily	   to	  
being	   described	   as	   containing	   any	   amount	   of	   noise,	   this	   value	   will	   have	   to	   be	   fixed	   by	  
investigators	  (…)	  this	  option	  yields	  an	  investigator-­‐	  relative	  notion	  of	  phenomena.	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  
219,	  223)	  
	  
While,	  my	  Kantian	  stance	  goes	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  McAllister’s	  in	  rejecting	  an	  ontology	  of	  phenomena	  
as	   being	   ‘out	   there’	   in	   nature	   causing	   patterns	   in	   data	   sets,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   disagrees	   with	  
McAllister	  about	  where	  to	  locate	  the	  mind-­‐dependent	  aspect	  of	  phenomena.	  I	  would	  not	  locate	  it	  at	  
the	  level	  of	  noise	  control,	  and	  I	  envisage	  a	  more	  robust	  role	  for	  it.	  Take	  McAllister’s	  (2004,	  pp.	  1166–
1168)	  analysis	  of	  Galileo’s	  experiments:	  
	  
An	  example	  of	  a	  phenomenon,	  according	  to	  Galileo,	   is	   free	   fall.	  However,	  each	   instance	  of	  
free	   fall	   is	   also	   partly	   determined	   by	   accidents	   (…)	   In	   the	   limiting	   case,	   if	   the	   influence	   of	  
accidents	   could	  be	   reduced	   to	   zero,	   it	  would	  be	  possible	   to	   read	  off	   the	  properties	  of	   the	  
phenomenon	  from	  an	  occurrence.	  (…)	  Galileo’s	  polishing	  and	  smoothing	  of	  his	  experimental	  
apparatus	  yielded	  the	  desired	  result.	   (…)Distinct	  performances	  of	  any	  concrete	  experiment	  
with	  falling	  bodies	  that	  was	  technically	  feasible	  at	  Galileo’s	  time	  would	  not	  have	  accorded	  on	  
any	  clear-­‐cut	  phenomenon	  of	  free-­‐fall.	  
	  
I	  completely	  agree	  with	  McAllister’s	  comment	  that	  no	  actual	  amount	  of	  experience	  would	  back	  up	  
Galileo’s	  phenomenon	  of	   free-­‐fall.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   I	   resist	  his	  conclusion	  that	   if	  Galileo	  had	  only	  
been	  able	  to	  reduce	  the	  influence	  of	  accidents	  and	  noise	  to	  zero,	  he	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  read	  
off	   the	   properties	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   free	   fall	   from	  occurrences.	   No	   amount	   of	   polishing	   and	  
smoothing	  the	  experimental	  apparatus	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  free	  fall,	  unless	  
we	   introduce	  some	  key	  assumptions	  or	  suppositions	  under	  which	  we	  construct	  certain	  kinematical	  
properties,	  which	  is	  precisely	  what	  Galileo	  did,	  according	  to	  the	  Kantian	  line	  I	  am	  suggesting.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  James	  McAllister	  (private	  communication)	  would	  disagree	  with	  my	  use	  of	  the	  expression	  ‘mind-­‐dependence’	  
to	  refer	  to	  his	  position,	  which	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  a	  ‘thoroughgoing	  empiricism’,	  whereby	  the	  expression	  
‘phenomena’	  does	  not	  appear	  any	  longer	  and	  ‘all	  evidence	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  world	  is	  constituted	  by	  
patterns	  in	  data	  sets’	  (seeMcAllister’s	  paper	  in	  this	  volume).	  As	  the	  discussion	  here	  below	  will	  clarify,	  I	  use	  the	  
expression	  ‘mind-­‐dependence’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  specific	  ‘investigator-­‐dependent’	  choice	  of	  the	  noise	  level,	  which	  
enters	  in	  McAllister’s	  analysis	  of	  how	  some	  patterns	  in	  data	  sets	  are	  identified	  as	  phenomena.	  
Thus,	   I	   share	  McAllister’s	   ontological	   perspective	   in	   recognising	   that	   the	  world	   is	   a	   complex	  
causal	   mechanism	   that	   produces	   data	   in	   which	   a	   variety	   of	   phenomena	   can	   be	   discerned,	   but	   I	  
diverge	  from	  him	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  mind-­‐dependent	  feature	  of	  phenomena	  
with	  noise	  control.	  I	  think	  instead	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  kinematical	  
data	  are	  organised	  and	  dynamical/causal	  concepts	  applied.	  Of	  course,	  this	  divergence	  is	  indicative	  of	  
a	  more	  substantial	  divergence	  about	   the	  human	  contribution	   to	   the	  phenomena.	  While	  McAllister	  
thinks	  that	  it	  is	  down	  to	  investigators	  to	  stipulate	  which	  patterns	  in	  data	  sets	  count	  as	  phenomena,	  I	  
think	  there	  is	  more	  to	  this	  process	  than	  human	  ‘stipulation’.	  
	  
3.1.2	  Phenomena	  are	  not	  stipulated	  by	  investigations	  
	  
McAllister	   (1997,	   p.	   217)	   defends	   the	   view	   that	   “each	   investigator	   may	   stipulate	   which	   patterns	  
correspond	   to	   phenomena	   for	   him	   or	   her”,	   by	   differently	   setting	   the	   noise	   level,	   and	   hence	   by	  
identifying	  different	  patterns	  in	  the	  same	  data	  set.	  He	  challenges	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward	  “to	  pick	  out	  
independently	   of	   the	   content	   of	   scientific	   theories	   which	   patterns	   in	   data	   sets	   correspond	   to	  
phenomena”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  222).	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  planetary	  motions	  (ibid.,	  p.	  
226):	  
	  
Asked	   in	  what	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  planetary	  orbits	  consists,	  Kepler	  would	  have	  replied	   ‘In	  
the	   fact	   that,	  with	   such-­‐and-­‐such	  noise	   level,	   they	  are	  ellipses’,	  while	  Newton	  would	  have	  
replied	  ‘In	  the	  fact	  that,	  with	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  noise	  level,	  they	  are	  particular	  curves	  that	  differ	  
from	   ellipses,	   because	   of	   the	   gravitational	   pull	   of	   other	   bodies’.	   Thus,	   phenomena…vary	  
from	   one	   investigator	   to	   another….	   Which	   aspect	   of	   the	   occurrences	   is	   singled	   out	   for	  
explanation	   varies	   from	   one	   investigator	   to	   another,	   notwithstanding	   the	   fixedness	   of	  
physical	  occurrences	  themselves…there	  are	  no	  grounds	  for	  claiming	  that	  either	  Aristarchus,	  
Kepler,	  Newton,	   Einstein,	   or	   anyone	  else	  has	   correctly	   identified	   the	  pattern	   to	  which	   the	  
phenomenon	  of	  planetary	  orbits	  corresponds	  while	  the	  others	  have	  failed.	  
	  
I	  think	  that	  McAllister’s	  characterization	  of	  patterns	  in	  data	  sets	  plus	  noise	  is	  (1)	  neither	  a	  sufficient,	  
(2)	  nor	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  phenomena.	  
	  
(1)	   It	   is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  because	   it	   is	  overpermissive:	   it	  multiplies	  phenomena	  without	  
necessity,	   unless	   some	   suitable	   provisos	   are	   introduced.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   all	   regular	  
patterns	   in	   data	   sets	   (obtained	   by	   simply	   varying	   levels	   of	   noise	   at	   the	   investigator’s	  
discretion)	   qualify	   as	   phenomena.	   Take	   as	   an	   example	   William	   Prout’s	   chemical	   theory	   in	  
1815.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	   tables	  of	  atomic	  weights	  available	  at	   the	  time,	  Prout	   thought	   that	   the	  
atomic	  weight	  of	  every	  element	  was	  an	  integer	  multiple	  of	  the	  hydrogen	  and	  hence	  identified	  
the	   hydrogen	   atom	   as	   the	   basic	   constituent	   of	   all	   chemical	   elements.	   Although	   Prout	  
identified	   a	   genuine	   pattern	   in	   data	   sets	   (plus	   noise	   level/accidents)	   which	   was	   indeed	  
vindicated	   in	  modern	  chemistry	  with	   the	  discovery	  of	   isotopes,	  we	  would	  not	  qualify	   it	  as	  a	  
phenomenon.	   Or	   take	   as	   another	   example	   eighteenth-­‐century	   chemistry.	   In	   post-­‐Lavoisier	  
chemistry,	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   Lavoisier’s	   idea	   of	   oxygen	   as	   the	   principle	   of	   acidity,	  
compound	  substances	  were	  normally	  listed	  in	  a	  series	  according	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  oxygen	  they	  
contained,	   and	   regular	   patterns—	   namely,	   series	   of	   binary	   combinations	   of	   oxygen	   with	  
simple	  substances	  up	  to	  four	  degrees	  of	  “oxygenation”—were	  identified	  and	  became	  popular	  
in	  chemistry	  textbooks	  of	  the	  time.	  There	  was	  however	  a	  problem	  with	  muriatic	  acid.	  Lavoisier	  
assumed	  that	  it	  was	  an	  oxide	  of	  an	  unknown	  radical	  which	  he	  called	  the	  ‘muriatic	  radical’,	  and	  
that	  it	  could	  be	  further	  oxidated,	  to	  form	  oxygenated	  muriatic	  acid	  (later,	  chlorine).	  This	  whole	  
muriatic	  series	  was	  built	  on	  an	  assumed	  analogy	  with	  the	  most	  common	  acids,	  namely	  vitriolic	  
and	  nitric.	  But	  the	  analogy	  was	  not	  borne	  out,	  and	  the	  series	  listed	  in	  chemistry	  textbooks	  of	  
the	  early	  19th	  century	  was	  revised	  after	  Davy	  determined	  that	  chlorine	  was	  an	  element,	  that	  
muriatic	   acid	   was	   hydrochloric	   acid	   (HCl),	   which	   contains	   no	   oxygen,	   and	   hence	   that	   the	  
hypothesised	  muriatic	   radical	   did	   not	   exist	   at	   all.5	   Again,	   not	   every	   identifiable	   pattern	   in	   a	  
data	  set	  qualifies	  as	  a	  genuine	  phenomenon.	  
(2)	  McAllister’s	   characterization	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   condition	   either	   for	   phenomena	   because	   it	  
oversimplifies	  the	  notion	  of	  phenomena	  by	  reducing	  it	  to	  a	  linear	  structure	  of	  the	  form	  F	  (x)	  =	  
a	   sinω	   x	   +	   b	   cos	  ω	   x	   +	   R(x)	   (where	   R(x)	   is	   the	   noise	   term—see	  McAllister	   1997,	   p.	   219).	   A	  
physical	   phenomenon	   is	   a	  more	   complex	   entity	   that	   this	   linear	   structure.	   And	   indeed	  most	  
phenomena	  do	  not	  obey	   this	   structure.	   Phenomena	   crucially	   involve	  parameters	  and	  hence	  
concepts	  that	  shape	  data	  sets	  in	  a	  way	  rather	  than	  another.	  And	  typically	  different	  parameters	  
and	  concepts	  used	  to	  carve	  data	  engender	  different	  phenomena	  in	  a	  way	  that	  vindicates	  the	  
complexity	  of	  scientific	  revolutions.	  
	  
McAllister’s	   analysis	   of	   how	  Aristarchus,	   Kepler,	  Newton,	   and	   Einstein	   engendered	  different	  
phenomena	  by	  setting	  the	  noise	  levels	  differently	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  capture	  the	  genuine	  conceptual	  
revolution	   that	   took	   place	   in	   the	   passage	   from	   Aristotelianism	   to	   Copernicanism.	   Similarly,	   his	  
analysis	  of	  Galileo’s	  experiment	  with	   the	   inclined	  plane	  and	  the	  phenomenon	  of	   free	   fall	  does	  not	  
seem	  to	  vindicate	  the	  genuine	  conceptual	  revolution	  that	  Galileo	  brought	  to	  mechanics,	  compared	  
to	  the	  Aristotelians.	  
In	  this	  respect,	  I	  think	  that	  a	  Kantian	  stance	  can	  provide	  a	  better	  philosophical	  standpoint	  for	  
the	  history	  of	  science:	  in	  the	  end,	  we	  do	  want	  to	  defend	  the	  view	  that	  the	  development	  of	  physics	  
from	   Galileo	   to	   Newton	   was	   a	   scientific	   revolution	   that	   improved	   our	   understanding	   of	   nature,	  
compared	  to	  Aristotelian	  physics.	  And	  one	  possible	  way	  to	  go	  about	  making	  this	  claim	  is	  to	  look	  at	  
the	   immediately	   preceding	   past	   history	   (say,	   Medieval	   impetus	   theory),	   its	   transformation	   with	  
Galileo’s	  concept	  of	   ‘impeto’	  (which	  was	  at	  quite	  a	  distance	  from	  Buridan	  and	  Oresme	  and	  yet	  still	  
somehow	  related	  to	  the	  Archimedean	  science	  of	  weights),	  and	  its	  paving	  the	  way	  to	  Newton’s	  new	  
concept	  of	  ‘gravitational	  attraction’	  (for	  details,	  see	  Massimi	  forthcoming).	  The	  specific	  Kantian	  story	  
of	  how	  we	  construct	  phenomena	   (by	  ascribing	  spatio-­‐temporal	  properties	   to	  appearances	   that	  we	  
then	  have	   to	  prove	  via	  experiments,	   and	   subsume	  under	   suitable	   causal	   concepts)	  does	   justice	   to	  
the	   idea	   of	   scientific	   progress.	   After	   all,	   justifying	   the	   progress	   achieved	   by	   Galilean–Newtonian	  




As	   I	  hope	   to	  have	  clarified,	  a	  Kantian	  stance	  on	  phenomena	  can	  potentially	  offer	  a	  genuinely	  new	  
perspective	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  we	  infer	  phenomena	  from	  data,	  by	  taking	  the	  distance	  both	  from	  a	  
metaphysics	  of	  ready-­‐made	  phenomena	  and	  from	  conventionalist	  readings.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  spelling	  
out	  the	  details	  of	  a	  Kantian	  stance	  and	  how	  exactly	  it	  translates	  into	  modern	  science	  (leaving	  aside	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  I	  thank	  Hasok	  Chang	  and	  Georgette	  Taylor,	  to	  whom	  I	  owe	  this	  example.	  
most,	  if	  not	  all,	  the	  baggage	  of	  Kant’s	  transcendental	  philosophy)	  is	  a	  very	  challenging	  enterprise	  and	  
much	  more	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done.	  But	  my	  goal	  in	  this	  paper	  was	  to	  show	  that	  this	  is	  an	  enterprise	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